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With the growing racial, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of the 
United States, issues of language and cultural barriers to equal jus­
tice are increasingly confronting prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
the courts. In 1990, in Massachusetts alone, 350,000 persons, or 
6.2% of all Massachusetts residents over the age of five did not 
speak English adequately or at all.1 Nationally, it is "estimated that 
... in 1990 the number of home speakers of non-English languages 
was nearly 32 million or approximately 12.6% of the total 
population."2 
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1. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRA· 
TlON, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, 
AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, MASSACHUSETTS tbl.2, at 10 (1990). 
2. State v. Santiago, 542 N.W.2d 466, 471 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (citing WIL· 
LlAM E. HEWITT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURT INTERPRETATION: 
MODEL GUIDES FOR POLICE AND PRACTICE IN THE STATE COURTS 11 (1995)). 
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For a criminal defendant, the ability to understand all proceed­
ings and communicate and consult with counsel at all times has a 
direct impact on the defendant's right to a fair trial and to other 
constitutional protections. The prosecution must also confront the 
issue of language. If a victim cannot communicate adequately in 
court, the state will have difficulty in meeting its burden of proof. 
English language difficulty hinders the right of equal access to 
the criminal justice system. Even if a defendant, victim, or witness 
speaks some English, he or she may not communicate or compre­
hend English adequately for a legal proceeding. In order to avoid 
significant misunderstandings, a hurdle of constitutional impor­
tance, the defendant or witness may need an interpreter. This is not 
due solely to the legal terms and more sophisticated forms of Eng­
lish used in courtrooms, but also because many persons who use 
English as a second language have difficulty speaking or compre­
hending English in a pressured or highly charged situation, or in a 
location that is not part of their common experience, such as in a 
courtroom or at a police station.3 
Given these language barriers, the role and competence of the 
interpreter is critical. Competent interpretation includes the ability 
to speak, understand, and accurately interpret the dialect of the for­
eign language witness, victim, or defendant. Misinterpretation of 
particular words or idioms may cause prejudice where an inter­
preter provides meanings or voice inflection that the defendant or 
witness did not intend.4 Dialect differences may be significant. 
The words used in one dialect to describe an emotion or idea may 
be quite different from those same words used in another dialect. 
Idioms or colloquial expressions from one dialect to another may 
not be able to be interpreted at all. For example, because the 
meaning of some words differs from country to country, an inter­
preter who grew up in the United States, and who speaks the Span­
ish used in the United States, may make critical errors in 
interpreting the Spanish spoken by a defendant or witness born and 
raised in Columbia.5 A proper voir diremay be necessary to ensure 
3. See Commonwealth v. Pana, 364 A.2d 895, 898-99 (Pa. 1976); see also Com­
monwealth v. Sanabria, 385 A.2d 1292, 1298 (Pa. 1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting). 
4. See Santana v. New York City Transit Auth., 505 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1986); see also United States v. Gaviria, 775 F. Supp. 495, 501 (D.R.I. 1991); 
State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (three bilingual interpreters 
examined audio tape and transcript of trial for appeal; all agreed there were errors in 
translation, but disagreed as to "the extent of the problem and the degree of prejudice, 
as well as the correct translation of specific testimony"). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th CiT. 1983) (refer­
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that even a court certified interpreter is qualified to interpret for a 
particular defendant or witness. 
Other translation challenges confront even qualified court in­
terpreters. At times, an interpreter is unable to interpret ade­
quately because the concept at issue does not exist in the foreign 
culture. Furthermore, "[c]ourts have recognized that words in one 
language may not be capable of exact translation into another lan­
guage, and it is therefore impossible in certain circumstances for an 
interpreter to convey the precise language of the witness to the 
court, jury, or defendant."6 It may be difficult to interpret certain 
legal concepts since many immigrants come from countries with 
legal systems very different from that of the United States. If no 
jury trial exists in the legal system of the defendant's home country, 
how does an interpreter explain the right to trial by jury so as to 
ensure a voluntary and knowing waiver of that right? 
Many individuals born and raised in foreign countries confront 
other practical obstacles to obtaining justice.7 Some lived in a 
country where police and authority figures terrorize its citizens. 
Immigrants from these countries often distrust and fear the police 
in the United States. Many immigrants lack familiarity with our 
legal system or have limited, if any, understanding of constitutional 
rights and procedures. 
Some defendants, victims, or witnesses from different cultures 
may be misunderstood, or their actions, appearance, or demeanor 
misinterpreted by police, parties, jurors, or the court itself. This is 
because social and behavioral norms of persons from a foreign 
country may appear suspect because they are not within the com­
mon experience of native-born Americans. Excessive and exagger­
ated hand gestures, for example, may be incorrectly interpreted as a 
sign of threatening behavior or emotional instability rather than be­
havior learned as a child in a foreign culture to accentuate a point. 
ring to the district court's comment "that the Spanish spoken in North America differs 
from that spoken in South America, which would create confusion on the part of the 
government agents" and the defendant); see also State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 831­
32 (Minn. 1987). 
6. State v. Casipe, 686 P.2d 28, 33 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984); see also Her, 510 N.W.2d 
at 223 ("Any translation is inevitably a screen placed between the witness and the jury, 
affecting the jury's ability to assess credibility from demeanor, inflection of voice, nu­
ances of language, and details of testimony. "); State v. Fung, 907 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
7. See Her, 510 N.W.2d at 221 ("The apparent differences between Hmong and 
American cultures in their treatment of rape, adultery, and female sexuality were a 
major element of the trial. "). 
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Prejudicial misimpressions may result because a defendant fails to 
make eye contact with the police or jury, speaks in a voice unnatu­
rally loud or soft, or appears without emotion. These and other 
forms of non-verbal communication may be misinterpreted because 
of cultural differences. An understanding of cultural norms may be 
relevant and necessary to the accurate evaluation of a defendant's 
demeanor and behavior in interactions with the police, in assessing 
witness credibility, as well as in determining the level of culpability 
and contrition of a defendant for sentencing purposes. 
Cultural and language barriers may affect whether a defendant 
is able to make a voluntary confession,8 knowingly and voluntarily 
consent to a search,9 waive the right to trial by jury,lO or fully un­
derstand the elements of the charge,11 the rights waived,12 and the 
effect of the plea in a plea bargain proceeding.!3 Lack of knowl­
edge of the American legal system, rights under the Constitution, 
English language difficulties, and cultural background differences, 
along with other factors, have been considered in judicial assess­
ments of whether there is a voluntary and knowing waiver of such 
rights. I4 
Courts have made clear that there is a legal duty and require­
ment to accommodate those with linguistic and cultural barriers. I5 
But what does that really mean? This Article surveys the contours 
of the right to an interpreter and the impact of cultural differences 
in the context of specific court determinations. Proceeding step-by­
step through the criminal justice system from the establishment of 
the professional relationship to the sentencing hearing, linguistic 
and cultural issues are examined, with a focus on the broad array of 
trial and appellate issues at play. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER 
The right to a court-appointed interpreter in criminal proceed­
8. See infra part III.B. 
9. See infra part III.e. 
10. See infra part III.G. 
11. See infra part III.H. 
12. See infra part III.H. 
13. See infra part III.H. 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Gallego-Zapata, 630 F. Supp. 665,674-75 (D. Mass. 
1986); United States v. Nakhoul, 596 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (D. Mass. 1984), affd sub 
nom. United States v. EI-Debeib, 802 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1986). 
15. See United States v. Gallegos-Torres, 841 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1988) (de­
fendant who has difficulty with language has right to interpreter). 
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ings is squarely within the discretion of the trial judge.16 Only in 
limited circumstances have appellate courts held that the failure of 
trial courts to afford adequate interpreter services constituted an 
abuse of discretion or was clearly erroneous in violation of a de­
fendant's federal or state constitutional or statutory rights,17 
Although different judicial tests have been applied to deter­
mine if failure to provide an interpreter was error, appellate courts 
appear to focus the inquiry on whether a defendant had been de­
nied a fair trial or whether the proceedings were fundamentally un­
fair, considering the totality of the circumstances. The review is 
highly factual and varies from case to case. Where a trial court has 
failed to appoint a qualified interpreter, the burden falls on the 
criminal defendant to show that his lack of comprehension of the 
proceeding was so complete that the trial was fundamentally unfair. 
The California Supreme Court has described in vivid detail the 
breadth of the criminal defendant's right to, and need for, an inter­
preter at every stage of a criminal proceeding: 
The defendant's right to understand the instructions and rul­
ings of the judge, the questions and objections of defense counsel 
and the prosecution, as well as the testimony of the witnesses is a 
continuous one. At moments crucial to the defense-when evi­
dentiary rulings and jury instructions are given by the court, 
when damaging testimony is being introduced-the non-English 
speaking defendant who is denied the assistance of an inter­
preter, is unable to communicate with the court or with counsel 
and is unable to understand and participate in the proceedings 
which hold the key to freedom.18 
II. DENIAL OF INTERPRETER ASSISTANCE: 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Several courts in criminal cases have discussed whether the 
lack of continuous, competent interpreter services personal to the 
defendant rises to the level of a constitutional or statutory depriva­
tion.19 In determining whether the trial court's failure to appoint an 
16. See United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1991) (matters regard­
ing use of interpreter left to discretion of district court); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 
465,475 n.3 (Tenn. 1993) (collecting cases). 
17. See People v. Escalante, 627 N.E.2d 1222, 1224, 1227-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
(defendant's right to fair trial denied by court's refusal to wait for interpreter to appear 
before beginning examination of state witness). 
18. People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Cal. 1984) (in bank). 
·.19. See, e.g., People v. Truong, 553 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) . 
. . 
198 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:193 
interpreter denied the defendant a fair trial or rendered the crimi­
nal proceeding fundamentally unfair, appellate courts ask the fol­
lowing questions: 
(1) Did the non-English speaking defendant have counsel, 
and, if so, was the defendant able to consult with and assist his 
or her attorney?20 
(2) Did the defendant possess sufficient fluency in English to 
understand the testimony heard, the charges alleged, and the 
rights recited, or was he or she significantly inhibited in the 
ability to comprehend any portion of the proceedings?21 
(3) Did the defendant understand and respond to questions 
during examination without substantial difficulty?22 
(4) Did the defendant inform the trial court that he or she re­
quired an interpreter in order to make each and every aspect 
of the criminal proceeding comprehensible, or should the trial 
court have recognized that the defendant's comprehension at 
trial was significantly inhibited by language difficulties, and, if 
so, was interpretation provided at all times?23 
(5) Were the indictment and other critical written documents 
translated and provided in writing to the non-English speaking 
defendant in his or her own language?24 
(6) Was the defendant actually prejudiced by his or her inabil­
ity to comprehend any portion of the proceedings?2S 
(7) Did the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waive the 
right to have an interpreter at trial?26 
Other questions asked by appellate courts to ensure that crimi­
nal proceedings themselves were fundamentally fair and that the 
defendant preserved his or her legal rights include: 
(1) Was the interpreter "certified" or "qualified"?27 
20. See, e.g., People v. Avila, 797 P.2d 804, 806 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). 
21. See, e.g., Ton v. State, 878 P.2d 986, 987 (Nev. 1994). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1991). 
23. See, e.g., Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1362 (Del. 1992). 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 
48 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994); People v. Torres, 310 N.E.2d 780, 783 (III. App. Ct. 1974). 
25. See, e.g., State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (to succeed 
on appeal, defendant must show "tangible prejudice from the specific errors identi­
fied"); State v. Langarica, 822 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Nev. 1991) (finding no prejudice to 
defendant regarding guilty plea resulting from language barrier). 
26. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 682 A.2d 764, 770-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1996). 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Huang, 960 F.2d 1128, 1135 (2d Cir. 1992) (Court 
Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(I) (1994) requires interpreters be certified or 
otherwise qualified). But see Mendiola v. State, 924 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex. App. 1995) 
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(2) Was the interpreter competent and impartial?28 
(3) Was the interpretation generally accurate?29 
(4) Did the defendant alert the court in a timely fashion of the 
deficient qualifications or lack of impartiality of the interpreter 
or timely object to the lack of accuracy of the interpreter serv­
ices provided?30 
Factors that courts consider in determining a defendant's need 
for an interpreter are the defendant's length of stay in the United 
States, the nature of his or her professional or social interaction 
while residing in this country, as well as occupation, education, in­
telligence level, and citizenship status. Some courts will focus only 
on the defendant's level of fluency in speaking English.31 
III. PRE-TRIAL STAGE OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
A. Establishing the Professional Relationship 
Consideration of linguistic barriers for those who speak little 
or no English, or who come from a different country or culture, 
begins from the moment that counsel establishes a professional re­
lationship with the defendant, complainant, or witness. 
The first question that a defense attorney must consider is: 
"Can I adequately communicate with the defendant?" A prosecu­
tor must ask a similar question in working with complainants. If the 
defendant or complainant does not speak English and if counsel is 
not fluent in this foreign language, a competent interpreter should 
be immediately obtained. Even if the defendant or complainant 
speaks some English, counsel should retain an interpreter in order 
to ensure that confusion and misunderstandings do not develop. 
Defense counsel should also explore with the defendant any 
(interpreter not required to be certified under state law, but must have sufficient skill in 
interpreting and familiarity with slang). 
28. See Gonzales v. State, 372 A.2d 191, 192-93 (De\. 1977) (reversible error for 
trial judge not to appoint unbiased and impartial interpreter); State v. Tamez, 506 So. 
2d 531, 533-35 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (guilty plea vacated where co-defendant interpreted 
plea colloquy and trial court failed to try to find impartial interpreter); Mendiola, 924 
S.W.2d at 162 (bailiff found competent to serve as defendant's interpreter). 
29. See Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Ind. 1989) (where accuracy of trans­
lation subject to grave doubt, defendant denied due process); People v. Truong, 553 
N.W.2d 692, 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (minor lapses in translation did not render trial 
unfair or deprive defendant of constitutional rights). 
30. See, e.g., Her, 510 N.W.2d at 222-23; People v. Gordillo, 594 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1986) (collecting 
cases). 
200 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:193 
. cultural biases or barriers that could affect his or her representa­
tion, including the preparation and presentation of the defendant's 
case. The defendant may have emigrated from a country with a 
criminal justice system vastly different from ours. Defense counsel 
should take the time to explain the nature of the criminal justice 
system, the jury system, the role of police and prosecutors, and the 
rights of a criminal defendant. It may be necessary for the prosecu­
tor to take similar steps with complainants. 
From the outset, defense counsel must also examine his or her 
own cultural biases, as well as those the defendant is likely to en­
counter in the ordinary course of criminal proceedings. Counsel 
needs to determine if he or she has any biases that might interfere 
with the ability to serve as an effective advocate on behalf of this 
defendant. Defense counsel must consider if others (police, prose­
cutors, judges, or jurors) likely have biases which may lead, or 
which have already led them to misunderstand the defendant's ac­
tions, attitude, motives, or demeanor because of differences in cul­
tural background. Many of the same inquiries may be appropriate 
for a prosecutor to consider in working with complainants, as well 
as for the purpose of ensuring the defendant a fair trial and avoid­
ing reversal on appeaL 
B. The Arrest and the Interrogation 
Questioning by police can be upsetting to anyone. Consider, 
then, the potential for confusion and anxiety of someone subjected 
to an arrest or interrogation who does not speak English. Defense 
counsel as well as prosecutors should probe thoroughly all aspects 
of the arrest to ensure that language barriers or cultural back­
ground did not taint the investigation, lead to a violation of rights, 
or to an unknowing or involuntary waiver during interrogation. 
Counsel should begin the inquiry with any statements the de­
fendant may have made before being advised of his or her constitu­
tional rights. Who was present? What were the circumstances? 
Who interpreted? Was the interpretation accurate? Did the police 
record it accurately? 
If the defendant made statements after being given Miranda 
warnings, counsel should carefully examine the circumstances to 
ensure that his or her rights were "knowingly and intelligently" 
waived.32 This means much more than the fact that the police 
32. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 434, 444 (1966) (indicating that a defendant, 
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translated the Miranda warnings into the defendant's language. 
Counsel must consider, in addition to the defendant's background, 
understanding of the American legal system, and all the surround­
ing circumstances to determine the adequacy of the warnings and 
the sufficiency of the waiver. 
In this regard, an important case is United States v. Nakhoul.33 
Considering motions made by three Middle Eastern defendants to 
suppress post-arrest statements on the grounds of an invalid waiver, 
the federal district court of Massachusetts stated that the appropri­
ate inquiry should cover "all the circumstances surrounding the in­
terrogation, including the defendants' age, experience, education, 
background, and intelligence."34 The Nakhoul court allowed the 
suppression motion of one defendant, a Lebanese national living in 
the United States, who "was locked up, alone, in a small windowless 
room for a period of time and then questioned by two unfamiliar" 
investigators.35 The court reasoned that Nakhoul's understanding 
of American law, customs, and constitutional rights may have been 
too limited and the warnings too inadequate in this situation to per­
mit him to understand his rights.36 Another important case is 
United States v. Short,37 where the Sixth Circuit found English-only 
Miranda warnings insufficient for a West German defendant who 
had been in the United States only three months, barely spoke Eng­
lish, was socially isolated while living on an army base, and was 
unfamiliar with the American criminal justice system.38 
Other courts have also affirmed the relevance of alienage and 
lack of familiarity with the American legal system to the judicial 
inquiry, while denying the motion to suppress based on the totality 
of the facts presented in the particular case.39 In United States v. 
Youse/,40 however, one defendant, charged with conspiring to de-
after being informed of his rights, "may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the 
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently"). 
33. 596 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Mass. 1984), affd sub nom. United States v. El-Debeib, 
802 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1986). 
34. Id. at 1401. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. at 1401-02. 
37. 790 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1986). 
38. See id. at 469. 
39. See United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Trabucco, 424 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (5th Cir. 1970); Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 
1380-82 (Del. 1993) (cultural experts testified at suppression hearing that it was ex­
tremely unlikely that a Chinese immigrant would fail to submit automatically to a police 
request). . 
40. 925 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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stroy an airplane, among other allegations, unsuccessfully argued 
that the voluntariness of his confession made to the FBI was af­
fected by the alleged torture and physical abuse he had suffered for 
three months while in the custody of Philippine law enforcement 
officials. The court refused to impute the coercive nature of his 
Philippine detention to American law enforcement officials, since 
no American "official coercion" was claimed.41 
To succeed in a motion to suppress, it may at times be neces­
sary for the defense to use an expert linguist who personally evalu­
ates the defendant's lack of English language comprehension. In 
United States v. Higareda-Santa Cruz ,42 the federal district court in 
Oregon, relying in part on an expert linguist's testimony about the 
defendant's English language limitations, granted the motion of a 
Mexican drug defendant to suppress evidence and statements be­
cause the defendant did not understand what rights he was waiv­
ing.43 The district court concluded that the prosecution had not 
shown that the defendant had made a valid waiver.44 
Does a subsequent request for interpreter services necessarily 
invalidate prior statements given without the presence of an inter­
preter? One court has held that the fact that a defendant requests 
an interpreter for his court proceedings renders suspect, but does 
not automatically invalidate, Miranda warnings given without the 
aid of an interpreter.45 The federal district court in United States v. 
Granados46 determined that Miranda warnings provided solely in 
English were constitutionally sufficient, even where a non-English 
speaking defendant had requested an interpreter at trial, since the 
police officer had explicitly asked the defendant if he understood 
those rights. The transcript of the interrogation by police revealed 
that the defendant spoke and understood English fairly wel1.47 
Most appellate courts, ruling on the adequacy of interpreta­
tions of Miranda warnings to individuals with some form of lan­
41. [d. at 1077 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985)) (stating that 
the Fifth Amendment is only "concerned with moral and psychological pressures to 
confess emanating from ... official coercion"). 
42. 826 F. Supp. 355 (D. Or. 1993). 
43. See id. at 358-60. 
44. See id. at 360. But see United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412, 
1415 (9th Cir. 1985); Liu, 628 A.2d at 1380. 
45. See United States v. Lizardo-Acosta, No. 93-40030-020-SAC, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6351, at *26-27 (D. Kan. Apr. 4, 1994). 
46. 846 F. Supp. 921 (D. Kan. 1994). 
47. See id. at 924-25; see also Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
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guage or cultural barrier, have relied upon practical tests to 
determine whether defendants' waivers were voluntary. For exam­
ple, in United States v. Abou-Saada,48 the First Circuit denied the 
defendant's appeal, relying in part on the defendant's ability to pro­
vide, in English, to an interrogating agent of the Drug Enforcement 
Agency, a detailed medical description of a complicated neck in­
jury.49 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, in United States v. Bernard S. ,50 relied on the fact that after 
the law enforcement officer had explained to the defendant in Eng­
lish each of his rights, the defendant affirmatively stated that he 
understood those rights. The defendant, whose primary language 
was Apache, also stated that he did not have any questions.51 
Many courts, applying the clearly erroneous standard, have af­
firmed trial courts' findings of a voluntary waiver. In Common­
wealth v. Colon,52 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
concluded that the trial court had not erred in finding that the 
waiver was knowing and intelligent despite the defendant's allega­
tions that he was unable to speak English.53 The court also discred­
ited the defendant's allegation that he was beaten during 
interrogation.54 
Generally, when police show a card containing Miranda warn­
ings in the non-English speaking defendant's language, it is suffi­
cient to permit a waiver of rights if the defendant has read the card 
and indicates an understanding of what he has read.55 In United 
States v. Toscano-Padilla,56 a conviction for drug traffic conspiracy 
was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit where the Spanish-speaking de­
fendant understood and waived his Miranda rights read to him 
from a card preprinted in Spanish, even though the Miranda waiver 
form he signed was written in English. An INS agent testified that 
he translated the waiver form into Spanish, paragraph by para­
graph, before the form was initialed and signed by Toscano-Pa­
48. 785 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). 
49. See id. at 10. 
50. 795 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1986). 
51. See id. at 752. 
52. 558 N.E.2d 974 (Mass. 1990). 
53. See id. at 980; see also Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 
1991) (Cuban-born Spanish-speaking police officer interpreted for defendant); Com­
monwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460, 466 (Mass. 1980) (Spanish-speaking police officer 
translated and explained Miranda warnings to defendant). 
54. See Colon, 558 N.E.2d at 980. 
55. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 581 N.E.2d lOW, 1015 (Mass. 1991). 
56. No. 92-30247, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15411 (9th Cir. June 16, 1993). 
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dilla.57 The agent's translation ability was not questioned at tria1.58 
The Ninth Circuit held that the execution of a written waiver, 
printed in the defendant's own language; while preferable, is not 
mandatory for the waiver to be valid.59 
To create a record on which to appeal a court's ruling that Mi­
randa warnings were adequately interpreted, a defendant must in­
troduce evidence of the questionable interpretation practices of the 
interpreter, the terms or legal concepts misused, or evidence dem­
onstrating a defendant's lack of comprehension.60 In Common­
wealth v. Colon-Cruz,61 the defendant's attorney unsuccessfully 
challenged the linguistic adequacy of translated Miranda warnings. 
During cross examination, he asked a bilingual police officer to re­
peat the Miranda warnings he had given in Spanish to the Spanish­
speaking defendant on the night of the arrest.62 The court inter­
preter then was requested to evaluate the competence of the of­
ficer's interpretation.63 Based on the interpreter's testimony, the 
trial court found, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, that de­
spite two minor errors, there was no evidence that the warnings had 
been distorted or were inaccurate.64 
The issue of the bias or competence of the interpreter who pro­
vided Miranda warnings should be raised by defense counsel, when 
appropriate. However, a defendant does not have a constitutional 
right to an independent, non-police translator when questioned 
prior to tria1.65 In addition, a defendant does not have a right to an 
interpreter with the advanced language skills of a court interpreter, 
since at this stage of the criminal process the standards for court 
interpreters have no application.66 However, in State v. Santiago,67 
57. See id. at *2-3. 
58. See id. at *3. 
59. See id. at *3 n.1. 
60. See United States v. Lopez-Parra, No. 91-50747, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13077, at *2-3 (9th Cir. May 28, 1993); State v. Roman, 616 A.2d 266, 269-70 (Conn. 
1992) (defendant did not challenge interpreter's competence and stated that he under­
stood what had transpired during police interview); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 451 
N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Mass. 1983) (defendant who testified in English presented no evi­
dence that he did not understand English). 
61. 562 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 1990). 
62. See id. at 803. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. at 804. 
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alves, 625 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
66. See, e.g., People v. Marquez, 822 P.2d 418, 427 (Cal. 1992); see also State v. 
Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 829-31 (Minn. 1987). 
67. 542 N.W.2d 466 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
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a defendant successfully appealed a drug conviction where he re­
ceived Miranda warnings in Spanish from a Milwaukee police of­
ficer who had no formal training in Spanish and could neither read 
nor write Spanish, but could speak the language fluently.68 The of­
ficer testified that the words he had actually used were not close to 
those on the commonly available Spanish language Miranda card, 
but instead gave a "street language" version.69 Although defense 
counsel requested that the officer recite the Spanish words he had 
used to provide the Miranda warnings, and that the court-ap­
pointed interpreter translate those words into English for the rec­
ord, the trial court refused to allow this procedure.7° Unable to 
write in Spanish, the officer could not provide a written version. In 
the absence of a clear and accurate record of the actual Miranda 
warnings given, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence to permit review. The court then 
vacated and reversed the conviction and remanded the case for fur­
ther evidentiary hearings.71 
C. The Consent to Search 
If the defendant consented to a search, many of the above con­
siderations would also apply. Counsel must determine whether the 
defendant's consent was voluntary; that, in turn, requires counsel to 
examine the totality of the circumstances. English language com­
prehension, cultural background, and understanding of the Ameri­
can legal system may be relevant factors.72 
Lack of English language comprehension caused the federal 
district court of Illinois, in United States v. Yambo,73 to grant a 
Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican defendant's motion to suppress 
physical evidence from a search at O'Hare Airport in Chicago. Re­
lying in part on the defendant's linguistic expert, the court found 
that although the defendant understood that the law enforcement 
officers wanted to search his luggage, he lacked sufficient English 
language comprehension to realize that he had a right to refuse the 
68. See id. at 468, 472. 
69. [d. at 469. 
70. See id. at 469, 472. 
71. See id. at 472. 
72. See, e.g., State v. Loera, Nos. 11586-1-IlI, 11854-1-III, 1994 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 224, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. May 19, 1994); State v. Xiong, 504 N.W.2d 428, 431­
32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
73. No. 88 CR 320, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 905 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1989). 
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search,74 Similai"ly, in United States v. Restrepo,75 the court sup­
pressed the evidence of cocaine obtained from a car search because 
the defendant's limited English led him to sign the consent form 
"without comprehending what it said about the scope of the search 
or his right to refuse."76 In United States v. Gaviria,77 the federal 
district court of Rhode Island held that the prosecution had failed 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's 
consent to search his plastic shopping bag at a bus terminal was 
voluntary or knowing. Therefore, the court granted the defendant's 
motion to suppress the cocaine found. The court, relying upon a 
court-certified interpreter's testimony that "any native Spanish 
speaker would have found it difficult or impossible to understand 
much of the detective's Spanish,"78 concluded that the linguistic 
competence of the police detective who questioned the Spanish­
speaking defendant, partly in English and partly in Spanish, was in­
adequate,79 Other factors supported the finding that the consent 
was not voluntary, including the defendant's age (twenty-one), his. 
limited formal education (only in Columbia), the presence of three 
detectives during this encounter, the retention of his green card 
throughout the questioning, and the fact that the defendant had 
neither read nor signed a written consent form in Spanish.80 On the 
other hand, in State v. Montano,81 the court found that the Cuban 
defendant understood English well enough to know that he was 
consenting to a search of his residence, and held that failure to com­
ply with the state's interpreter statute at the time of the custodial 
interrogation was not per se grounds for the suppression of 
evidence.82 
The defendant's cultural background is also relevant to the in­
74. See id. at *4,6-7. 
75. 890 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
76. Id. at 197; see also United States v. Castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 
1983) (holding that where the issue of voluntary consent to search is raised, a trial court 
must carefully review and make specific factual findings as to a defendant's language 
comprehension); United States v. Higareda-Santa Cruz, 826 F. Supp. 355, 359-60 (D. 
Or. 1993) (indicating that consent was not valid where defendant did not have sufficient 
knowledge of English to realize he could refuse to consent). 
77. 775 F. Supp. 495 (D.R.I. 1991). 
78. Id. at 500 n.6. 
79. See id. at 496, 500. 
80. See id. at 500, 502. The court noted that Hispanic suspects are "doubly disad­
vantaged" by having English language difficulty while also lacking familiarity with 
Fourth Amendment rights to the Constitution. See id. at 502. 
81. 855 P.2d 979 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). 
82. See id. at 983-84. 
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quiry of whether consent was given and may lead to the granting of 
a motion to suppress. For example, in United States v. Gallego­
Zapata,83 the federal district court of Massachusetts rejected the 
prosecution's claim of consensual search of the Columbian defend­
ant's bag and jacket at a stop upon his arrival at Logan Airport, 
from a flight from New York, and granted the defendant's motion 
to suppress the cocaine seized. The court relied upon the defend­
ant's extremely limited fluency in English, in combination with the 
defendant's young age (twenty-two), his limited education (seven 
years in Columbia), and his employment in Columbia (as a truck 
driver).84 The court also found that as a result of the defendant's 
recent arrival in the United States (four months), he "probably 
lacked familiarity with his rights under the United States Constitu­
tion, including his right to insist that the officers obtain a search 
warrant," nor was he told "that he could refuse to allow them to 
search."85 Although the police are not required to inform a defend­
ant of his right to refuse a search, the failure "can be part of the 
totality of the circumstances that indicate that consent was not truly 
voluntary."86 The court concluded that the law enforcement agents 
lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the defendant's 
seizure or the resulting limited search, and lacked probable cause to 
justify the more intrusive search.87 
A defendant's subjective fear of a police beating based on his 
or her cultural background or national origin may also be a relevant 
factor in determining if the consent was coerced, so long as such 
fear is reasonable and is based on some objective conduct by gov­
ernment officials.88 However, in State v. VU,89 the defendant, who 
was from Vietnam, unsuccessfully argued that a comprehensive ex­
planation of the warrant process and the protections it was meant 
to afford was required before consent could be voluntary,9o The 
court held that while differing cultural values might, in the abstract, 
render consent to search involuntary, the defendant himself failed 
to argue at trial that his cultural background caused him to be co­
83. 630 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1986). 
84. See id. at 675. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 668. 
87. See id. at 672-75. 
88. See United States v. Castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1283 n.l, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,558-59 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bus­
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973». 
89. 770 P.2d 577 (Or. 1989). 
90. See id. at 579-80. 
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erced into compliance.91 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in State v. Xiong,92 also 
found both cultural and language barriers relevant in ruling upon a 
motion to suppress. The court declared that "consent did not have 
to be fully informed; it merely had to be given in an atmosphere 
free of coercive influences. "93 According to the court, the defend­
ant's wife, who provided consent to search their home, lacked 
knowledge of the American judicial system, lacked understanding 
of American customs, had language difficulties, and did not under­
stand the word "warrant."94 However, the court affirmed the de­
nial of the motion to suppress, holding the consent voluntary, while 
nonetheless recognizing that "language barriers make a determina­
tion of voluntariness more difficult."95 The court stated that "[t]he 
more vulnerable a person is because of his or her unique character­
istics, the more easily he or she may be coerced by subtle means."96 
According to the court, "[i]f effective communication is not pro­
vided, then that is a form of coercion. "97 Despite this careful analy­
sis of the role that language difficulties and cultural background 
may play in creating coercion, the court found coercion absent, and 
based on the totality of the circumstances, found the consent to 
search valid.98 
D. Lineup and Identification 
Can a defendant effectively argue that a lineup is unduly sug­
gestive because a non-English speaking participant is unable to fol­
low the police officer's directions in English? . In People v. 
Marquez,99 the court held that a lineup was not unnecessarily sug­
gestive, even though the defendant, who spoke Spanish, did not 
move as directed when police instructions were stated in English. 
Other lineup participants moved only when the instructions were 
stated in Spanish, while still others moved when commands were 
made in English.10o All six lineup participants were Hispanic males 
91. See id. at 580. 
92. 504 N.W.2d 428 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
93. Jd. at 432. 
94. Jd. at 430-31. 
95. Jd. at 432. 
96. Jd. at 431. 
97. Jd. at 432. 
98. See id. 
99. 822 P.2d 418 (Cal. 1992). 
100. See id. at 427. 
209 1997] ROLE OF COUNSEL AND COURTS 
of similar build.101 The court reached this conclusion even though 
the victim believed that the perpetrator did not speak English. The 
court did not indicate, however, how it would have ruled if the de­
fendant had been the only lineup participant who responded to 
Spanish commands. 
E. The Grand Jury 
In what circumstances can a defendant successfully object to 
the composition of the grand jury as a denial of the defendant's 
right to due process? This question was raised in Commonwealth v. 
Slaney,102 where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
stated that "the defendant has the burden of proving that the ab­
sence of a certain class from a jury list resulted from an 'arbitrary 
and systematic' policy of exclusion directed against an 'identifiable 
group in the community which may be the subject of prejudice."'103 
In People v. Guzman,104 the defendant, of Hispanic origin, 
claimed that Hispanics were deliberately excluded from the jury 
pool despite their forming a recognizable, distinct class. Affirming 
the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, the 
court held that underrepresentation by Hispanics on the grand jury 
was not due to purposeful discrimination, but rather to Hispanics' 
lower response to summonses, their lower qualifying rate due to 
English literacy deficiencies, and other factors. Only purposeful 
discrimination would lead to a valid constitutional challenge.105 . 
F. Preliminary Hearings and Pretrial Proceedings 
During any pretrial proceeding, it is critical for the defense and 
prosecution to ensure that an interpreter is present on behalf of the 
defendant. This does not mean merely that there must be someone 
in the courtroom who speaks the defendant's language. The inter­
preter should be available exclusively to the defendant to provide 
continuous sentence-by-sentence interpretation of the proceedings, 
including the court's rulings and open-court colloquy between the 
bench and counsel.106 In Massachusetts, without evidence of preju­
101. See id. 
102. 215 N.E.2d 177 (Mass. 1966). 
103. [d. at 179 (citations omitted) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,205 
(1965); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59 (1961)). 
104. 454 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), affd, 457 N.E.2d 1143 (N.Y. 1983). 
105. See id. at 863. 
106. See, e.g., People v. Menchaca, 194 Cal. Rptr. 691, 693-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983). 
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dice, use of an informal interpreter such as a fellow prisoner (or 
relatives and friends) at the pretrial stage has been held not to vio­
late a defendant's rights. However, the Supreme Judicial Court has 
stated that the use of an impartial interpreter is preferred, even for 
pretrial conferences. t07 
Defense counsel and prosecutors may also have an obligation 
to attempt to ensure that the defendant obtain the translation of 
critical legal documents. In United States v. Mosquera,1OB involving 
the narcotics prosecution of eighteen Spanish-speaking defendants, 
each with separate counsel, the court held that due process and the 
Confrontation Clause required that the criminal defendants be 
given written translations of the indictment, relevant parts of cited 
statutes, and other documents. An oral description by an inter­
preter of the contents of the critical documents was held to be insuf­
ficient to satisfy these requirements. Otherwise defendants "would 
have to rely on their memory of an oral interpretation that occurred 
under circumstances where they might feel ill-at-ease and have dif­
ficulty concentrating."109 
The Seventh Circuit, however, in Canizales-Satizabal v. United 
States,110 distinguishing in part and rejecting in part the ruling in 
Mosquera, held that a defendant does not have a constitutional 
right to have the indictment or other trial documents "translated 
into his own language."111 The court also declared that the federal 
interpreter statute did not require written translation of documents, 
and that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the lack of 
translation. The defendant had been read the indictment in Spanish 
and discussed it with his attorney.1 t2 
G. Waiver of Jury Trial 
If the defendant waives a jury trial, the presence or absence of 
an interpreter during the waiver colloquy, as well as the defendant's 
cultural background, are factors relevant to the question of whether 
107. See Commonwealth v. Garcia Brito, 525 N.E.2d 383, 388 (Mass. 1988) (hold­
ing is clouded by issues of defendant's waiver and lack of timely objection); see also 
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460, 469 n.6 (Mass. 1980). 
108. 816 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 48 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994). 
109. Id. at 175. 
110. No. 95-1831, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38214 (7th Cir. Dec. 20, 1995), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1057 (1996). 
111. [d. at *3 n.2. 
112. See id. at *4; see also People v. Torres, 310 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1974) (stating that the defendant was not required to be provided written translation of 
the indictment where the defendant was fully informed orally of the charges). 
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a waiver was knowing and voluntary. In Commonwealth v. 
Abreu,113 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that 
the trial court's finding of waiver of the right to a jury trial was 
erroneous where the record indicated that the defendant spoke lit­
tle English, came from a foreign nation which did not have jury 
trials, and where the record showed that the trial judge asked the 
defendant one single question, "phrased in conclusory terms."114 
The insufficiency of the non-English speaking defendant's 
waiver of the right to jury trial was also successfully raised based on 
a one word affirmative response to the judge's question, without 
any colloquy, in Lopez v. United States,115 The District of Colum­
bia Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings on 
the issue. The defendant had only five years of education in her 
native Honduras, and had been working as a janitor in the United 
States for a year.116 The court took judicial notice that the jury sys­
tem did not exist in Honduras.117 In contrast, in United States v. 
Rosa,118 a Spanish-speaking defendant was unsuccessful in chal­
lenging her waiver of a jury trial on the ground that she did not 
have the assistance of an interpreter. The court found that the de­
fendant adequately understood both the English language and the 
waiver proceeding.119 
H. The Plea Bargain 
Culture and language can also present barriers to a defendant's 
knowing and intelligent participation in a plea bargain. Under­
standing of the elements of the charge and the rights waived are 
critical factors. For example, in Valencia v. United States, 120 the de­
fendant sought a writ of habeas corpus, contending that when he 
had entered his guilty plea, he had not understood the essential ele­
ments of the drug offense charged. The First Circuit agreed, finding 
that the defendant, who was arrested on a vessel in international 
waters but subject to United States jurisdiction, did not receive 
clear guidance from the court or counsel on the complex legal ques­
113. 463 N.E.2d 1184 (Mass. 1984). 
114. [d. at 1186-87. 
115. 615 A.2d 1140 (D.C. 1992). 
116. See id. at 1147. 
117. See id. 
118. 946 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1991). 
119. See ill. at 508. 
120. 923 F.2d 917 (1st Cir. 1991). 
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tions involved.121 The defendant had little education or familiarity 
with the American legal system but had been assisted by an inter­
preter.122 The First Circuit also provided instructions to the district 
court. It stated that a trial court should personally address the de­
fendant in open court, inform the defendant of, and determine that 
a defendant understands, every essential element of each alleged 
offense to which the plea is offered with due regard for their com­
plexity and the individual characteristics of the particular defend­
ant,123 In State v. Orozco,124 the Spanish-speaking defendant from 
EI Salvador had his plea of guilty vacated after the appellate court 
found that the defendant lacked an intelligent understanding of the 
elements of the charge (attempted possession of cocaine) com­
pounded by his lack of understanding of English.125 Similarly, in 
Diaz v. State,126 the signing of untranslated waivers and trial docu­
ments by a defendant caused the defendant's guilty plea for aggra­
vated possession of marijuana to be vacated since it was not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.127 The defendant, 
an indigent Mexican laborer unable to read, write, or understand 
English, signed the waivers without an understanding of their 
meaning and of the constitutional guarantees implicated.l28 
Language barriers combined with cultural background differ­
ences led the district court of Illinois, in United States v. Leung,129 
to permit the defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas to illegal 
gambling. The court held that the defendants' linguistic difficulties 
and lack of cultural understanding rendered their guilty pleas invol­
untary and unknowing.130 There had been some difficulty with the 
interpreter, and the defense stated that counsel's conversations with 
the eighty-four year old defendant were "handicapped" by the de­
fendant's "unwillingness to express disagreement, a Chinese cul­
tural trait."131 
Where a trial court enters a plea based on the statement of the 
interpreter to the court that the defendant fully understood the 
121. See id. at 921-22. 
122. See id. at 921. 
123. See id. 
124. 609 So. 2d 1043 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
125. See id. at 1046. 
126. 905 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). 
127. See id. at 309. 
128. See id. at 306, 309. 
129. 783 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
130. See id. at 360-61. 
131. Id. at 359. 
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court instructions and the effect of the plea, without an interpreted 
colloquy on the record between the court and the defendant, the 
plea will be vacated for prejudicial error.132 In Parra v. Page,133 the 
appellate court vacated the entry of a plea of guilty for murder that 
had been made without an interpreter present at any stage of the 
proceeding, where the record reflected that the defendant, an uned­
ucated Mexican migrant worker, had a poor knowledge of the Eng­
lish language. l34 
A defense counsel must fully inform his or her non-English 
speaking client of the plea bargain and the rights waived. Testi­
mony by an interpreter that the defense attorney failed to fully in­
form the defendant of a plea bargain has led to vacation of a plea 
and remand.135 Furthermore, allegations that a court interpreter 
deliberately failed to interpret accurately the communications be­
tween the defense attorney and the defendant about prison time to 
be served under the plea bargain may lead to vacation of a guilty 
plea, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.136 
It is incumbent on defense counsel to point out to the court the 
defendant's need for an interpreter at the plea hearing, and to make 
a timely objection if the interpreter is not provided or is not compe­
tent. For example, in United States v. Japa,137 the First Circuit 
found that a Spanish-speaking defendant's plea was knowing and 
voluntary where there had been no suggestion to the trial court that 
the defendant did not understand what was being said and there 
had been no objection to the competency of the interpreter.138 
Similarly, in United States v. Perez ,139 the defendant, a Mexican citi­
zen who had resided in the United States for nineteen years, twice 
assured the magistrate that he understood the plea proceedings and 
did not require an interpreter.14° The Fifth Circuit held that in the 
absence of a judicial finding that the defendant's comprehension of 
the proceedings was inhibited by language difficulties, the guilty 
132. See State v. Pina, 361 N.E.2d 262, 265-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); see also 
Monte v. State, 443 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
133. 430 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967). 
134. See id. at 836-37. 
135. See, e.g., United States v. Navarrette, No. 93-35193, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14423 (9th Cir. June 10, 1994). 
136. See, e.g., Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1994). 
137. 994 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1993). 
138. See id. at 904. 
139. 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990). 
140. See id. at 489-90. 
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plea was valid.141 
IV. TRIAL STAGE OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
A. Jury Composition 
Is the absence or underrepresentation of members of the de­
fendant's racial or ethnic group a constitutional violation? In Com­
monwealth v. Rodriguez,142 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that while a defendant is constitutionally enti­
tled to a jury selection process free of discrimination against his 
group in the community, the absence of any member of defendant's 
racial or ethnic group in a petit jury pool is not a per se constitu­
tional violation.143 However, absence of jurors from the defend­
ant's racial or cultural group may be held to violate the defendant's 
due process rights in some instances. l44 
To succeed in challenging the venire, a defendant must show 
that there had been systematic or purposeful exclusion by a prose­
cutor of jurors on the basis of race. 145 Nor may a defendant use 
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.146 The 
challenge must be timely; before a juror is sworn.147 Even if the 
exclusion is purposeful, however, there is no constitutional right to 
have a jury composed of non-citizens or of non-English speaking 
members.148 
B. Voir Dire-Jury Selection Process 
If there is to be a jury, defense counsel and prosecutors should 
prepare voir dire questions relevant to the defendant's or a wit­
ness's language or cultural barriers. Prospective jurors should be 
141. See id. at 491; see also Corado v. State, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 2960, at *3-4 
(Tex. App. Nov. 27, 1991). 
142. 300 N.E.2d 192 (Mass. 1973). 
143. See id. at 196-97. 
144. See, e.g., Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 902-05 (Alaska 1971). 
145. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 93-99 (1986); see also Commonwealth v. Colon, 558 N.E.2d 974, 986 (Mass. 1990); 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499,508-16 (Mass. 1979); id. at 516 ("group affili­
ations which may not permissibly form the basis for juror exclusion: sex, race, color, 
creed or national origin"); Rodriguez, 300 N.E.2d at 196-97. 
146. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-59 (1992); see also Common­
wealth v. Harris, 567 N.E.2d 899, 903 (Mass. 1991) (stating that a peremptory challenge 
of the only member of a protected class by the prosecution or the defendant is pre­
sumptively discriminatory and improper). 
147. See Rodriguez, 300 N.E.2d at 196. 
148. See Commonwealth v. Acen, 487 N.E.2d 189, 194-96 (Mass. 1986). 
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prepared for the fact that the defendant or witness will be using an 
interpreter during the trial and they should be asked questions to 
determine whether they have any linguistic or cultural biases. 
However, information provided to prospective jurors by de­
fense counsel about the illegal immigrant status of the defendant 
that may create prejudicial misconceptions about the defendant, 
even if the reference was part of a supposed defense voir dire strat­
egy, may create grounds for reversal for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.149 In Hernandez v. New York,150 the United States 
Supreme Court held that prosecutors did not discriminate by chal­
lenging for cause and stril;dng Spanish and English-speaking bilin­
gual prospective jurors whose conduct suggested that they might be 
unwilling to agree to rely solely on the interpreter's official inter­
pretation of a Spanish-speaking witness's testimony.151 The prose­
cution based its juror challenges on the "specific responses and the 
demeanor" of the two prospective jurors during voir dire, and not 
their language proficiency alone.152 
Does counsel need to ensure that an interpreter is available for 
a non-English-speaking defendant during the voir dire? One fed­
eral appeals court has held that a trial judge's failure to ensure that 
the voir dire was interpreted did not violate a Spanish-speaking de­
fendant's right to be present and participate in jury selection.153 
The defendant had lived and worked in the United States for over 
seven years and had an interpreter present and readily available to 
him so that he could consult with his counsel throughout the voir 
dire.154 However, in Martinez v. State,155 the Indiana Court of Ap­
peals held that since jury selection is a critical stage of a criminal 
proceeding, the absence of an interpreter during jury selection jeop­
ardized the defendant's right to "assistance of counsel and his right 
to be meaningfully present at every stage of the proceedings."156 
149. See, e.g., Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 726-27, 734-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1987) (en banc) (holding that the defense was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of 
counsel). 
150. 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
151. See id. at 369-70. 
152. [d. at 360; see also Commonwealth v. Festa, 341 N.E.2d 276, 282-83 (Mass. 
1976) (without regard of prejudice, court assumed that two Italian-speaking jurors 
properly followed the judge's instructions to disregard witness testimony made in ital­
ian not interpreted into English). 
153. See United States v. Coronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d 1284, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 
1985). 
154. See id. 
155. 449 N.E.2d 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
156. [d. at 310. 
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C. Trial and Trial Examinations 
As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has 
stated, "[t]he right to an interpreter rests most fundamentally ... on 
the notion that no defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of 
an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment."157 
Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court declared, in State v. Na­
tividad,158 that holding a trial for a defendant who is unable to un­
derstand the English language without an interpreter "would be as 
though a defendant were forced to observe the proceedings from a 
soundproof booth ... , being able to observe but not comprehend 
the criminal processes whereby the state had put his freedom in 
jeopardy. Such a trial comes close to being an invective against an 
insensible object."159 
In the most sweeping decision upholding a non-English-speak­
ing defendant's constitutional right to an interpreter under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Second Circuit, in United States ex rei. Negron v. New 
York,160 held that the summary interpretation of testimony at a 
murder trial for an illiterate, indigent Puerto Rican defendant ren­
dered the trial constitutionally infirm.161 Similarly, the Appeals 
Court of Massachusetts has also stated in dicta, in Commonwealth 
v. Tureli,162 that "the assistance of an interpreter may well be a mat­
ter of right 'where the indigent defendant has little or no under­
standing of English. "'163 It has also been held that when defense 
counsel also serves as an interpreter during any stage of the crimi­
nal proceeding, a defendant is denied his constitutional rights, and 
157. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973); see also United 
States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207,1209-10 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a defendant should 
not be inhibited from comprehending the proceedings or testimony given against him in 
English); People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1201-05 (Cal. 1984) (outlining the 
parameters of the constitutional right to an interpreter throughout criminal proceed­
ings); People v. Escalante, 627 N.E.2d 1222, 1227-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (constitutional 
right of confrontation requires the presence of an interpreter during cross-examination 
of police officers); State v. Kounelis, 609 A.2d 1310, 1313-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1992) (stating that a defendant who is unable to speak or understand English has a 
constitutional right to have the trial proceedings translated to permit the defendant to 
participate in the defense). 
158. 526 P.2d 730 (Ariz. 1974). 
159. [d. at 733. 
160. 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970). 
161. See id. at 388-90. 
162. 381 N.E.2d 1123 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (rescript). 
163. [d. at 1124 (quoting Negron, 310 F. Supp. at 1307); see also Parra v. Page, 
430 P.2d 834, 837 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967); Villarreal v. State, 853 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1993). 
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his conviction requires reversal.164 
Citing the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be present at 
a trial and to confront witnesses against him, the Illinois Court of 
Appeals, in People v. Escalante,165 reversed and remanded a convic­
tion for burglary of a motor vehicle after a bench trial because of 
the court's failure to wait for the interpreter or to grant a continu­
ance. Such judicial conduct was held to constitute an abuse of dis­
cretion, rendering the non-English-speaking defendant, in essence, 
not present at tria1.166 
It is generally the duty and burden of the defendant to raise the 
need for an interpreter in a timely fashion. 167 However, once the 
defendant requests an interpreter through counsel, the trial court 
must conduct an inquiry into the defendant's ability to speak and 
understand English.168 Even if the defendant fails to raise the need 
for an interpreter, a court has a duty to inquire "as to the need for 
an interpreter when a defendant has apparent difficulty with 
English."169 
Since the trial court is in a superior position to evaluate a de­
fendant's fluency in the English language, wide discretion is granted 
by an appellate court in making this assessment. In Massachusetts, 
it has been held that the trial judge has broad discretion to deter­
mine the level of a defendant's language barrier, the stage in a pro­
ceeding at which an interpreter must be provided, and how much 
164. See People v. Chavez, 177 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
165. 627 N.E.2d 1222, 1227-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
166. See id. at 1228. However, the remedy for any failure to provide a qualified 
interpreter at a default judgment hearing in the state district court in Massachusetts is 
to give the defendant a rehearing with an interpreter. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Espi­
noza, 546 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). 
167. See United States v. Torres, No. 94-1113, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 264, at *20 
(6th Cir. Jan. 4, 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2628 (1995). : 
168. See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 15 (lst Cir. 1974); see also 
Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707 F. Supp. 504, 508 (M.D. Fla. 1989); State v. Neave, 344 
N.W.2d 181, 188-89 (Wis. 1984). 
169. Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing the 
Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1827); see also United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 
1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980); Carrion, 488 F.2d at 15; Hrubec v. United States, 734 F. 
Supp. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the trial court must determine the need for 
an interpreter only when it is evident that the defendant has language difficulties which 
inhibit his comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counselor the 
judge); State v. Yang, 549 N.W.2d 769, 771-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that when­
ever a trial court has doubt as to the defendant's competency to communicate with 
counsel in English, to understand the testimony of witnesses, or to be understood when 
speaking, it has sufficient notice of defendant's language difficulties to require a suspen­
sion of the trial to hold a hearing and to make a factual determination of the need for 
an interpreter). 
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translation is required.170 The denial of a motion for an interpreter 
should be made outside the presence of the jury "because of the 
negative inference that may be drawn from the court's refusal."171 
Defense counsel and the prosecutor should ensure that the 
trial court appoints a "defense interpreter" for the defendant, sepa­
rate from the "witness interpreter" used by a court to translate the 
testimony of non-English-speaking witnesses.172 In People v. Ro­
mero,173 involving a prosecution for second degree murder, the 
Spanish-speaking defendant was held to have been denied due pro­
cess of law under the federal and state constitutions when one inter­
preter was used both to assist the defendant and to interpret the 
testimony of eight Spanish-speaking witnesses, even with the accord 
of defense counsel,l74 Using only one interpreter may deny a de­
fendant "a spontaneous understanding of the testimony and the 
proceedings."175 However, where the Spanish-speaking defend­
ant's interpreter was borrowed to interpret the testimony of Span­
ish-speaking witnesses, no error was found since the defendant did 
not need an interpreter to understand the testimony of those 
witnesses.176 
The role of the "witness" interpreter at trial is to perform con­
tinuous word-for-word interpretation of counsel's questions and the 
responses of witnesses at the trial, with no editing by the inter­
preter. Nor should the interpreter engage in any private colloquies 
with the witness. The interpreter's sole role is to translate, not to 
advise the witness or the defendant,177 
170. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460,469-70 (Mass. 1980). 
171. Commonwealth v. Pana, 364 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 1979). 
172. See People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Cal. 1984) (detailing three 
distinct but interrelated roles of "defense," "witness," and "proceeding" interpreters). 
173. 200 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
174. See id. at 406. 
175. Id.; see also People v. Nieblas, 207 Cal. Rptr. 695, 696-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984) (borrowing of defense interpreter for testimony of three prosecution witnesses 
causes reversal of murder conviction for denial of defendant's constitutional rights); In 
re Dung T., 206 Cal. Rptr. 772,776-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (right of defendant to own 
interpreter guaranteed by the California Constitution). 
176. See Falciola v. State, No. 04-95-00366-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3158, at 
*2-3 (Tex. Ct. App. July 24, 1996); see also People v. Avila, 797 P.2d 804, 806 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1990); State v. Kounelis,609 A.2d 1310, 1314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) 
(court stated that it may be permissible to have only one interpreter if the witness inter­
preter is available to translate testimony of English-speaking witnesses for the defend­
ant); State v. Vue, Nos. 95-0782-CR-NM, 95-0783-CR-NM, 1995 Wis. App. LEXIS 1180, 
at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1995). 
177. These and other practical guidelines on the use of interpreters at trial were 
provided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Festa, 
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Failure to provide a personal interpreter for each defendant 
during the reading of jury instructions may, in certain circum­
stances, require reversal if the defendant can demonstrate that he 
tried, unsuccessfully, to communicate with counsel at that junc­
ture.178 But the failure to provide an interpreter during closing ar­
guments and jury instructions has been held to constitute harmless 
error if there is no evidence that the basic fairness of the trial was 
compromised.179 It has also been held to be prejudicial error for a 
trial court to have the stenographer read back testimony to the jury 
without waiting for the interpreter to be present so that the defend­
ant could "effectively participate in the readback of the 
testimony."180 
For a waiver of the right to an interpreter to be effective, the 
defendant must knowingly and voluntarily relinquish that right.18I 
The California Supreme Court has held that a waiver must be per­
sonally made by the defendant with an "'affirmative showing,' on 
the record," through an open court colloquy with the defendant.182 
Failure to request an interpreter does not constitute a waiver, and 
any waiver may be withdrawn by the defendant at any stage of the 
criminal proceeding.183 
Appellate courts have developed varied standards for review 
of the denial of an interpreter by a trial court. In Massachusetts, 
the Supreme Judicial Court has stated that the judge's exercise of 
his discretion in providing interpreter services at trial will only be 
disturbed on appeal if "the record reveals blatant insensitivity to a 
language problem" resulting in a fundamentally unfair trial,184 
"The test for both confrontation and effective assistance cases in 
this context is the same: was the defendant hampered by a language 
problem in any meaningful way in presenting his defense?"185 
"[T]he crucial factor is the level of fluency of a given defendant."186 
Other courts have applied a less stringent standard of review than 
341 N.E.2d 276, 283-84 (Mass. 1976); see also United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 442­
43 (1st Cir. 1986). 
178. See People v. Chavez, 283 Cal. Rptr. 71,75-76 (Cal. Ct. App.1991). 
179. See Luu v. People, 841 P.2d 271, 275 (Colo. 1992). 
180. People v. Pizzali, 552 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
181. See State v. Natividad, 526 P.2d 730, 733 (Ariz. 1974); In re Dung T., 206 Cal. 
Rptr. 772, 778-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Kounelis, 609 A.2d at 1314. 
182. People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1204 (Cal. 1984); see also In re Dung 
T., 206 Cal. Rptr. at 778. 
183. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221C, § 3 (1994). 
184. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460, 470 (Mass. 1980). 
185. Id. at 470 n.7. 
186. Id. at 470. 
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the Massachusetts "blatant insensitivity" test.187 
The trial court· also has wide discretion to determine whether a 
witness shall be examined with the aid of an interpreter.188 How­
ever, in Commonwealth v. Pana,189 a conviction was reversed be­
cause the judge, without justification, had denied the defendant's 
request to testify in Spanish. A court-appointed interpreter had 
been present at trial and had assisted the defendant, who spoke 
some English, with particular words and phrases.19o While testify­
ing, the defendant's language difficulties became so acute that the 
assistant district attorney joined in the request.191 The appellate 
court held that even though the decision to use an interpreter rests 
in the sound discretion of the trial judge, the defendant in this case 
was effectively denied his right to testify, resulting in prejudicial er­
ror.192 The court observed that "a witness may be unable to under­
stand or respond to questions, particularly on cross-examination, 
due to the tenseness and unfamiliarity of the circumstances, even 
though he has some familiarity with English."193 
In United States v. Mayans,194 the Ninth Circuit reversed a drug 
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial after the trial 
court ordered the withdrawal of the defendant's interpreter, and 
after urging the defendant to testify in English in the name of effi­
ciency. The reversal was based on the grounds that the defendant's 
statutory right to an interpreter and his constitutional right to tes­
tify on his own behalf had been denied.195 The Ninth Circuit chas­
tised the district court for requiring the defendant to, in effect, 
submit to a test of his English while testifying on the stand before 
the jury.196 
The qualifications of an interpreter fall within the area of the 
187. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) (total­
ity of the circumstances test for effective assistance of counsel claims); United States v. 
Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1985) (four-prong due process test); United 
States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1980) ("fundamental fairness" test); Vas­
quez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 932, 938 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("would results of proceedings 
have been different" test for effective assistance of counsel claims). 
188. See United States v. Tejada, 886 F.2d 483, 488-89 (1st Cir. 1989). 
189. 364 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1976). 
190. See id. at 896. 
191. See id. at 897. 

192.. See id. at 898-99. 

193. Id. at 899... 
194. 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994). 
195. See id. at 1180-81. 
196. See id. at 1181. 
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judge's discretion.197 However, a criminal defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to be confronted by the witnesses against him 
may be violated when a trial court appoints an ineffective and in­
competent interpreter. In People v. Starling,198 which involved an 
appeal of a robbery conviction, the prosecution complained that it 
had difficulty understanding the translated testimony of a witness. 
Despite frequent admonitions from the judge, the interpreter en­
gaged in unrecorded discussions with the complaining witness. It 
was held that the trial court abused its discretion in the selection 
and retention of the unqualified interpreter.199 
When either the defense or prosecution questions the qualifi­
cations or competency of the interpreter, contests the interpreter's 
ability to communicate with the defendant or witness, or challenges 
whether the interpreter is unbiased, counsel should request a hear­
ing prior to trial to examine such competence or bias, which may 
include a voir dire of the interpreter.2oo If misinterpretations are 
claimed during trial, objections should be made outside the hearing 
of the jury.201 
During the trial, the prosecution or defense may challenge in­
accurate or incomplete interpretations to cure them. This can be 
accomplished by cross-examination, by introducing independent ev­
idence of incorrect interpretation, or by cross-examining the inter­
preter himself as to what the witness had said.202 Objections to trial 
interpretation errors must be made in a timely fashion or they are 
generally waived.203 In one case, United States v. Urena,204 a de­
fendant's general objections to the competency of an interpreter 
were held sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.205 However, 
197. See Commonwealth v. Salim, 503 N.E.2d 1267, 1274 (Mass. 1987). 
198. 315 N.E.2d 163 (III. App. Ct. 1974). 
199. See id. at 168. 
200. See State v. Van Pham, 675 P.2d 848,857-58 (Kan. 1984); see also People v. 
Estrada, 221 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
201. See Van Pham, 675 P.2d at 858. 
202. See State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824,831-32 (Minn. 1987); State v. Her, 510 
N.W.2d 218,222-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862,875 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1368 (1995); see also People v. 
Johnson, 120 Cal. Rptr. 372,373-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that it is prejudicial 
error for the trial court to refuse the defendant a-meaningful opportunity to impeach 
the translation of the interpreter). 
203. See Ramirez v. Price, 1994 U.S. App. LEX IS 35701, at *10 (10th Cir. Dec. 
19,1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1435 (1995); Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 
1566 (11th Cir. 1989); State V. Vue, Nos. 95-0782-CR-NM, 95-0783-CR-NM, 1995 Wis. 
App. LEXIS 1180, at *3-4 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1995). 
204. 27 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1994). 
205. See id. at 1492. 
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the Spanish-speaking defendant's conviction for drug-related 
charges was affirmed due to insufficient evidence of interpreter in­
competence.206 The court noted that if the defendant's objections 
were focused on misinterpretation of a "particular, key portion of 
testimony," rather than on a broad claim of interpreter incompe­
tence, the result may have been different.207 In another case, the 
Utah Court of Appeals denied a defendant's appeal of the appoint­
ment of a Cantonese interpreter on the ground that the interpreter 
had no experience in court interpretation, and was incompetent as 
well as biased.208 The court held that the defendant failed to partic­
ularize his objections or show actual prejudice.209 
In People v. Cunningham,210 the defendant's conviction for 
first degree criminal sexual conduct was reversed on the ground 
that the interpreter for the complainant interfered with the defend­
ant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. In­
stead of providing "'to the witness the precise form and tenor of 
each question propounded, and no more or less,'" and instead of 
interpreting '''the precise expressions of the witness,'" the inter­
preter "had a conversation with the complainant" for the purposes 
of clarification that was not translated for the jury.211 Whereas vio­
lation of the right to adequate cross-examination is generally sub­
ject to harmless-error analysis, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
found it impossible to apply this standard in the absence of a tape 
recording of the cross-examination at issue.212 
In People v. Torres ,213 the court ruled that it was improper to 
admit a translated transcript of a tape recorded conversation of an 
alleged drug transaction because the defendant was not afforded an 
opportunity to challenge the qualifications of the original inter­
preter and "the accuracy of the transcript" through cross-examina­
tion of that interpreter.214 However, the court held that this was 
not reversible error since the defendant could have either called his 
own expert interpreter or challenged the accuracy of the transcript 
by questioning the bilingual investigating police officer who was 
206. See id: at 1492-93. 
207. Id. at 1491 n.3. 
208. See State v. Fung, 907 P.2d 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
209. See id. at 1194. 
210. 546 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
211. Id. at 716 (quoting Rajnowski v. Detroit, B.C. & A.R. Co., 41 N.W. 849, 850 
(Mich. 1889)). 
212. See id. at 717. 
213. 210 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
214. Id. at 376-77. 
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present during the questioning.215 
D. Trial Defenses Based on Culture 
As discussed above, defense counsel have at times successfully 
raised the issue of cultural differences to lead various courts to sup­
press defendants' statements made to law enforcement officials. 
However, defendants have found it difficult to assert successfully 
that cultural differences justify or excuse criminal conduct. In one 
case, a rape defendant, an Iranian who had lived in the United 
States only two years, contended that his limited and infrequent use 
of English and his lack of familiarity with American social mores 
prevented him from perceiving that the mentally retarded victim 
lacked mental capacity to consent.216 The appeals court was not 
persuaded, noting that the defendant had testified at trial without 
an interpreter and that his testimony indicated an intelligent under­
standing of the proceeding.217 In another case, ~ Hmong was con­
victed of raping a recent Hmong immigrant to whom he was 
providing job counseling.218 The defendant asserted unsuccessfully 
that rape was not a concept recognized within Hmong culture.219 
A cultural defense was also rejected in Ha v. State ,220 where 
the trial court had refused to grant a self-defense instruction for a 
Vietnamese defendant on a second-degree murder charge. The de­
fendant argued that he reasonably believed that he was facing fu­
ture harm from the victim and, because of his Vietnamese cultural 
background, believed that he could not receive help from the po­
lice.221 The appellate court agreed that understanding Vietnamese 
culture was relevant in evaluating the victim's motivation or readi­
ness to kill the defendant, and was a proper matter to be consid­
ered.222 But the court found that the defendant failed to produce 
215. See id. at 377; see also United States v. Fuentes-Montijo, 68 F.3d 352, 354-56 
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that when a defendant did not dispute the accuracy of the 
translated transcript of a tape recording, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
using the transcript at tria\); United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1457-58 (1st Cir. 
1992) (arguing that a defendant's right to confrontation in connection with cross-exami­
nation of a translator is not violated by merely deferring the cross-examination for good 
cause); United States v. Perez, No. 94-0192, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43, at *2, 11-13 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 1996). 
216. See People v. Farrokhi, 414 N.E.2d 921, 923-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
217. See id. at 925. 
218. See State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
219. See id. at 221-22. 
220. 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
221. See id. at 195. 
222. See id. 
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evidence that he reasonably believed that he was subject to an im­
minent threat of harm, as was legally required for a valid self-de­
fense claim.223 
E. 	 The Prosecutor's Use of the Defendant's Culture to Prove 
Guilt 
Defendants have also challenged the prosecution's use of cul­
tural background or stereotypes to prove guilt. In Varughese v. 
State,224 an Indian defendant, convicted of murdering his wife by 
setting her on fire, attempted unsuccessfully to rebut the State's ar­
gument that, in India, wife burning is a common way to dispose of 
an unwanted spouse.225 The defendant argued instead that his wife 
had followed Indian customs by immolating herself.226 The defend­
ant also argued that his nationality and alien status were used to 
create hostility against him.227 The court ruled, however, that the 
defendant waived any objection by failing to timely object.228 
Cultural background has been successfully used by prosecutors 
to counteract a defendant's evidence or by explaining a victim's re­
sponse or conduct at the time of the crime. When one defendant 
evoked the mores of a foreign land in order to excuse or justify his 
unlawful conduct, the prosecution then countered with contrary ev­
idence from the same culture. In State v. Her,229 the prosecutor 
presented evidence that a Hmong woman would not seduce a 
Hmong man, but only in response to the defendant's testimony that 
"'there is no such thing as rape'" in Hmong culture.23° In State v. 
Lee,231 the defendant unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the 
prosecution had engaged in misconduct by presenting rebuttal ex­
pert and lay witness evidence that the victim's failure to flee and 
her delay in reporting the offense were due to Hmong cultural re­
straints.232 The testimony served to counteract the defendant's tes­
timony. concerning Hmong attitudes about rape.233 
Cultur~l issues may be inappropriately raised by prosecutors at 
223. 	 See id. 
224. 	 892 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
225. 	 See id. at 193. 
226. 	 See id. 
227. 	 See id. at 192. 
228. 	 See id. at 194. 
229. 	 510 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
230. 	 Id. at 221. 
231. 	 494 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 1992). 
232. 	 See id. at 480. 
233. 	 See id. 
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trial. For example, a prosecutor's statements at examination and at 
closing about a Moroccan defendant's cultural background, con­
cerning the negative attitudes of residents of Morocco towards wo­
men, were held to be improper.234 The court, however, concluded 
that those statements did not prejudicially affect the rights of the 
defendant.235 
V. PosT-TRIAL STAGE OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
A. Sentencing 
Although the defendant has a right to have his or her hired 
interpreter at the sentencing hearing, a court is not required to ap­
point one, even if an interpreter was present during the trial, as long 
as the defendant has sufficient command of English.236 However, 
one state appellate court has held that the failure to provide simul­
taneous interpretation by an interpreter for the entire sentencing 
proceeding, "a critical stage of the criminal trial, constituted a denial 
of due process.237 The appellate court vacated the plea agreement 
for second degree murder.238 
Similarly, in Monte v. State,239 the Spanish-speaking defendant 
successfully appealed a seven year prison term for second degree 
murder, based on the trial court's failure to appoint an interpreter 
for his sentencing hearing. The court found reversible error, va­
cated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing, even though 
defense counsel failed to object to the lack of an interpreter.24o The 
court held that the denial was a fundamental violation of the de­
fendant's right to be present at sentencing.241 The court stated that 
"[o]ur system of justice has evolved too far for a defendant's ac­
knowledged language problem to cause him to be placed in a posi­
tion before the court which is not equal to that of an English­
speaking defendant in terms of communicative opportunities."242 
Although the trial court had not appointed an interpreter for sen­
234. See State v. Boulabeiz, 634 N.E.2d 700, 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
235. See id. 
236. See Commonwealth v. Rosadilla-Gonzalez, 480 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1985). 
237. See State v. Hansen, 705 P.2d 466, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). Note that in 
this case there was evidence that interpretation was so inadequate during other stages 
of the trial that it violated due process. See id. 
238. See id. 
239. 443 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
240. See id. at 342. 
241. See id. 
242. Id. 
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tencing, it did so for the plea hearing.243 However, because of ques­
tions as to the qualifications of the interpreter at the plea hearing, 
as well as apparent problems with the interpretation provided, the 
appellate court also stated that the defendant would not be pre­
cluded from seeking post-conviction relief to challenge the validity 
of his plea.244 
B. Cultural Issues in Sentencing 
Defense counsel should ensure that the court, in sentencing, 
consider how the defendant's cultural heritage or background may 
suggest circumstances in favor of mitigation. Moreover, defense 
counsel should alert the court to cultural background differences 
that might explain surprising, unusual, or incomprehensible behav­
ior or demeanor on the part of the defendant. For example, in Peo­
ple v. Superior Court (Soon fa Du ),245 the appellate court held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting probation in a 
voluntary manslaughter case where the trial court had found that 
the defendant's" 'failure to verbalize her remorse to the Probation 
Department [was] much more likely a result of cultural and lan­
guage barriers rather than an indication of a lack of true re­
morse. "'246 Along similar lines, a federal district court granted 
habeas corpus after it found that the defendant's counsel had failed 
to present evidence from an anthropologist and sociologist that the 
defendant's "apparent lack of emotion at trial did not necessarily 
indicate disinterest or coldness, but was consistent with cultural ex­
pectations of Chinese males. "247 
On the other hand, two United States courts of appeals have 
held that cultural differences were not grounds to depart downward 
from the sentencing guidelines. In United States v. Yu,248 a Korean 
tax lawyer sentenced to prison for attempting to bribe an IRS agent 
unsuccessfully argued that the district court erred in failing to con­
sider his cultural background which had led him to think it would 
be insulting not to offer a bribe.249 The Eighth Circuit also affirmed 
243. See id. at 340. 
244. See id. at 341 n.3. 
245. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
246. Id. at 181. 
247. Kwan Fai Mak v. Blodgett, 754 F. Supp. 1490,1499 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affd 
per curiam and remanded, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992). 
248. 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992). 
249. See id. at 953, 954-55. 
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the sentence in United States v. Natal-Rivera,25o where the defend­
ant was sentenced for conspiring with her male companion to dis­
tribute cocaine. She argued for reversal on the ground that the 
district court should have considered as a mitigating factor that Pu­
erto Rican women were socialized from childhood to follow their 
future husband's every command.251 The court held that the trial 
court did not err in failing to take this into account.252 Similarly, a 
Vietnamese defendant failed to persuade an appellate court in 
Texas that he was unfairly sentenced to death by a jury who had 
"'no understanding of the cultural concepts and mores of the Ori­
ental people, and with little or no understanding as to their thought 
processes, which must be different than ours."'253 
In Flores v. State,254 the defendant was convicted of driving 
while intoxicated and sentenced to one year in prison.255 The trial 
court, having found that the county in Texas where the trial took 
place had no rehabilitation program for Spanish-speaking persons 
convicted of alcohol related offenses, and that the state program 
offered in Spanish was worthless, denied probation.256 Flores peti­
tioned for discretionary appellate review, arguing that the trial 
court's consideration of linguistic competence as a factor in assess­
ing punishment was a denial of due process and equal protection of 
the laws under the United States and Texas Constitutions.257 The 
Texas court applied only a rational basis test to this denial, since 
probation is not a fundamental right and since language ability, un­
like race or national origin, is not a suspect classification.258 The 
court concluded that incarceration of this defendant was an appro­
priate punishment in the absence of any meaningful altemative.259 
The court declined to examine the disproportionate effect that such 
a denial would have on Hispanics convicted of driving while intoxi­
cated.260 Following United States Supreme Court precedent, the 
Texas court refused to substitute disparate impact analysis for that 
250. 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989). 
251. See id. at 393. 
252. See id. 
253. Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929,940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en bane) (quot­
ing Appellant's Brief at 29-30). 
254. 904 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en bane), cer!. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716 
(1996). 
255. See id. 
256. See id. at 130. 
257. See id. 
258. See id. at 130-31. 
259. See id. at 131. 
260. See id. 
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of discriminatory intent, or to extend disparate impact analysis into 
the realm of criminallaw.261 
CONCLUSION 
Our criminal justice system serves large numbers of individuals 
whose primary language is not English or who come from vastly 
different cultures. Courts are faced with the difficult challenge of 
effectively administering to the legal needs of those participants 
with language or cultural barriers. This challenge can only be suc­
cessfully met with the active participation and commitment of pros­
ecutors, defense counsel, and the courts. 
Courts have a constitutional mandate to ensure that our legal 
system provides equal access to justice, regardless of race, national 
origin, language, or culture. Defense counsel and prosecutors have 
the legal and ethical responsibility to raise issues of effective com­
munication and to reduce prejudice against defendants, complain­
ants, and witnesses who do not speak or understand English, or 
who are from a different country and culture. . 
Relatively few of the complex legal and factual issues that arise 
due to language or cultural differences have been thoroughly ex­
amined by the courts, resulting in a lack of clear guidance as to the 
exact contours of the rights implicated. Case law in criminal pro­
ceedings will further develop only if prosecutors and defense coun­
sel more often raise, and courts more often address, these issues at 
all stages of criminal proceedings. Only then will the clear stan­
dards necessary to ensure constitutional and statutory guarantees 
be established for all participants in the criminal justice system. 
261. See id. 
